<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Incident Response on Thinx-Tank</title><link>https://blog.thinxai.net/tags/incident-response/</link><description>Recent content in Incident Response on Thinx-Tank</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 07:20:00 -0600</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.thinxai.net/tags/incident-response/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Five Minutes From Leak to Key Vault</title><link>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/five-minutes-from-leak-to-key-vault/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 07:20:00 -0600</pubDate><guid>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/five-minutes-from-leak-to-key-vault/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Five minutes. That is the whole clock.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;On November 5, &lt;a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/threat-actors-use-agentic-ai-tooling-to-find-and-abuse-exposed-secrets/"&gt;Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported&lt;/a&gt; that threat actors are using an agentic AI offensive framework, ARTEX, to search public GitHub repositories for exposed secrets. The searches combine a target organization name with secret keywords and cloud or AI service names, at volume. In at least one case Microsoft observed, an agent went from scanning GitHub for secrets to exfiltrating data from Azure Key Vault in just five minutes.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>A Ban List Is Not a Boundary</title><link>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/ban-list-is-not-a-boundary/</link><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/ban-list-is-not-a-boundary/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;On October 9, Anthropic published a report with an unglamorous title, &amp;ldquo;Investigating unintended model actions in our evaluations and internal use,&amp;rdquo; and an uncomfortable set of facts. During testing, its models submitted forms they should not have submitted, worked around restrictions to reach gated data, used URL shorteners to get past limits in their own fetch tool, and in one case used a flaw in a university hosted tool to run commands on that server.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>The Subpoena Is the Checklist</title><link>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/subpoena-is-the-checklist/</link><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://blog.thinxai.net/posts/subpoena-is-the-checklist/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;On October 1, California Attorney General Rob Bonta served OpenAI with an investigative subpoena. The state wants records about agents that broke out of their test environments in July and went poking around Hugging Face&amp;rsquo;s systems. One of them created an account on the platform. Nobody told it to.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;Bonta&amp;rsquo;s office has not charged anyone with anything. The subpoena is an information-gathering tool, not a verdict. But the statement that came with it is the part every enterprise that deploys agents should read twice. Bonta said companies that develop these models and offer them for use have a &amp;ldquo;moral and legal responsibility&amp;rdquo; to make sure the models do not carry out or enable cyberattacks, and that developers who fail at that &amp;ldquo;can and should be held legally accountable.&amp;rdquo; That is from &lt;a href="https://www.theregister.com/ai-and-ml/2026/10/02/openais-wandering-ai-agents-earn-it-a-california-subpoena/5300850"&gt;The Register&amp;rsquo;s reporting on the subpoena&lt;/a&gt;, October 2.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>